

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00484 090904Z

16

ACTION ACDA-10

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S E C R E T MBFR VIENNA 0484

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: PARA 29 STABILIZING MEASURES

1. THE SOVIETS HAVE POINTED OUT AN INEQUITY IN THE SCOPE OF THE ONE-TIME 20,000 ANNUAL EXCEPTION TO RESIDUAL MANPOWER LEVELS ADVANCED IN THE DEC 5 KHLESTOV PLENARY STATEMENT. THIS MESSAGE DESCRIBES THE PROBLEM AND RECOMMENDS REMEDIAL ACTION.

2. THE WESTERN PLENARY STATEMENT PRESENTED ON 5 DEC (MBFR VIENNA 0477) INCLUDED THE NATO-APPROVED GUIDANCE ON PARA 29 STABILIZING MEASURES (USNATO 6753). INITIAL SOVIET REACTION WAS GIVEN INFORMALLY BUT VEHEMENTLY BY SOV REP SMIRNOVSKY WHO, LATER ON 5 DEC, CHARGED THAT ALLIED EXCEPTION LEVEL OF 20,000 WAS DRAWN TO PERMIT REFORGER BUT TO EXCLUDE NORMAL SOVIET ROTATIONAL PRACTICES. SMIRNOVSKY STATED THAT THIS WAS ONE MORE EXAMPLE OF GROSSLY INEQUITABLE ALLIED NEGOTIATING POSITIONS, AND

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00484 090904Z

THAT IT REINFORCED THE EVIDENCE THAT ALLIES WERE NOT SERIOUS

ABOUT NEGOTIATING IN MBFR.

3. THE US POSITION ON US AND SOVIET POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS, AS SET FORTH IN STATE 038837, IS THAT THESE LEVELS WILL HAVE TO BE RESPECTED AND QUOTE THAT THIS IN TURN WILL REQUIRE EXCEPTIONS FOR SUCH PURPOSES AS EXERCISES AND ROTATIONS UNQUOTE. BOTH POINTS EXERCISES AND ROTATIONS, WERE HANDLED TOGETHER. THE OPERATIONAL POINT WAS THAT THE WEST WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT THE TEMPORARY SOVIET OVERHANG FOR ROTATIONS IF THE SOVIETS ACCEPTED US OVERHANG FOR REFORGER.

4. OUR NOTES OF THE VERIFICATION PANEL MEETING ON 31 JUL 74, INDICATE THE ISSUE RELATING TO PARA 29 STABILIZING MEASURES WAS CHARACTERIZED AS: A. SHOULD THERE BE EXCEPTIONS TO POST-REDUCTION MANPOWER CEILINGS TO PERMIT EXERCISES AND LARGE-SCALE TROOP ROTATIONS; AND B. IF SO, HOW LARGE SHOULD THESE EXCEPTIONS BE. AT THAT MEETING, DISCUSSION CENTERED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON THE SIZE OF THE PERMITTED EXCEPTIONS, WITH THE ONLY MENTION OF POSSIBLE SOVIET NEEDS BEING THAT THEY WOULD WANT LARGE-SCALE EXCEPTIONS TWICE RATHER THAN ONCE PER YEAR.

5. HOWEVER, THE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NEGOTIATORS WHICH WERE FORMULATED AFTER THIS SESSION (STATE 211141) WOULD PERMIT LARGE EXCEPTIONS (20,000) FOR MILITARY EXERCISES ONLY, AND DROPPED THE ROTATIONS ISSUE. THIS CHANGE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY REFLECTED IN THE NAC GUIDANCE TO THE AD HOC GROUP WHICH FORMED THE BASIS FOR THE NETHERLAND'S REP DEC 5 PLENARY PRESENTATION.

6. THE OMISSION OF ROTATIONS FROM THE 20,000 EXCEPTION DESCRIBED IN THE USG INSTRUCTIONS APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN INADVERTENT. THE US CANNOT EXPECT TO OBTAIN SOVIET AGREEMENT TO EXCEPTIONS FOR OUR LARGE-SCALE EXERCISES WHILE DENYING THE SOVIETS THE RIGHT TO CONDUCT NORMAL TROOP ROTATIONS. MOREOVER, AS INDICATED BY SMIRNOVSKY, THE SOVIETS MAY USE THE INEQUITY AS A RATIONALE FOR DISMISSING THE EXCEPTIONS PROPOSAL OUT OF HAND. WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO CORRECT THE MISTAKES OF THE PROPOSAL MADE TO THE EAST BEFORE MOSCOW TAKES A DEFINITE POSITION ON OUR PROPOSAL. WE RECOMMEND THAT:

A. WE BE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM THE SOVIETS BILATERALLY IN
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00484 090904Z

VIENNA THAT IT WAS THE US INTENT THAT THE 20,000 EXCEPTION APPLY ALSO TO TROOP ROTATIONS, AND THAT WE WOULD INITIATE ACTIONS DURING THE RECESS TO CLARIFY THIS ISSUE. THIS AUTHORIZATION SHOULD BE RECEIVED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BUT IN ANY EVENT, PRIOR TO THE 12 DEC PLENARY SESSION.

B. THAT WASHINGTON INFORM NATO THAT THE OMISSION OF EXCEPTIONS FOR LARGE (I.E. SOVIET) TROOP ROTATIONS WAS INADVERTENT, AND

SEEK ALLIED CONCURRENCE IN APPROPRIATE MODIFICATIONS TO THE CURRENT
GUIDANCE TO THE AHG.RESOR

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